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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
SPACECRAFT RELATIVE MOTION AND RECONTACT ANALYSES 
By Robert  E. McAdams, C h a r l e s  J .  Gott, and  M a r l a n d  L. W i l l i a m s o n  
Lyndon  6 .  Johnson Space Cen te r  
SUMMARY 
The use of a separable space vehicle during the Apollo Program required that 
premission planning include the definition of separation procedures that would avoid 
accidental recontact and ensure maximum crew safety. Potential collision o r  acciden- 
tal recontact problems between the spacecraft and other space vehicles (or components) 
existed during most of the Apollo missions. These problems were identified before 
each Apollo flight, and appropriate solutions f o r  eliminating or minimizing the chance 
of collision were determined through relative motion analyses. More than 50 individ- 
ual separation procedures were designed, analyzed, and documented for  each of the 
final Apollo flights. The more significant of these separation studies and the acciden- 
tal recontact problems associated with them are presented in this report;  information 
is given for  each of the Apollo missions. 
After initial planning for the Apollo Program was underway, it became obvious 
that a large, well-organized, and well-managed separation study would be required to 
supplement the total mission planning effort. The development of this  effort and the 
scope of the responsibilities involved in meeting the requirement are discussed in this 
report. In addition, the computer simulation development that made possible the solu- 
tions to the many separation problems encountered is summarized. 
INTRODUCTION 
The pr imary reason for  a spacecraft-separation study w a s  to identify potential 
collision o r  accidental recontact problems between the spacecraft and other space 
vehicles (or components) and to determine, by performing relative motion analyses, 
appropriate solutions to eliminate or  minimize the chance of collision. Th’e identifica- 
tion of problem areas was accomplished by analyzing and verifying that the premission 
nominal and contingency operational spacecraft separation sequences and procedures 
were free of accidental recontact problems or, if  no separation procedure existed, by 
defining procedures that were free of accidental recontact problems. In addition, the 
separation study effort included the verification that integrated separation system 
hardware did not have inherent recontact problems, particularly with respect to motion 
occurring immediately after the separation event; for example, the mechanical ejection 
of the lunar module (LM) from the spacecraft  lunar module adapter (SLA). The follow- 
ing objectives were included in the separation study effor t :  identification of safe space- 
craf t  operational l imits (e. g. , the maximum permissible spacecraft  attitude rates 
during LM extraction from the SLA); confirmation of previously defined operational 
separation sequences and procedures fo r  subsequent missions; validation of recommen- 
dations for mission rules; investigation of the sensitivities of separation dynamics f o r  
various spacecraft and space vehicle configurations; and graphic presentation and 
illustration of the relative motions of various space vehicles (or components) in a 
separation procedures handbook for  each Apollo mission. The resu l t s  of the separation 
study efforts were required and used in flight planning, hardware design, crew proce- 
dures  and checklists, sepai-atttioii t i~hfi icjuz~,  red-timc ~ ~ i s s i c a  EL?PPO,P~, a ~ d  pestflight 
mission evaluations. A l l  resul ts  were officially documented and published as formal  
separation procedures (internal notes) at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
(JSC) (formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)). A significant study effort was 
necessary to  provide the required analyses fo r  the spacecraft elements and systems 
modes of operation in the Apollo Program. 
As an aid to the reader ,  where necessary the original units of measure have been 
converted to  the equivalent value in the Systgme International d'Unit6s (SI). The SI 
units a r e  written first, and the original units are written parenthetically thereafter.  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEPARATION STUDY EFFORT 
During ear ly  phases of the manned spacecraft programs, only a small  separation 
study effort w a s  established. Project Mercury and the Gemini Program consisted of 
flights that involved relatively simple separation procedures fo r  a small  number of 
modules o r  components. However, the Apollo Program consisted of flights that 
involved separation procedures of greater  complexity than those of earlier programs, 
because of an increase in the number of modules and components requiring separation. 
The possible abort o r  alternate missions fur ther  complicated the magnitude of the 
analysis required. Therefore, the separation study effort was greatly expanded for 
the Apollo missions to ensure that all accidental recontact problems would be identified 
and resolved or  reduced to an acceptable level of probability before each flight. 
The study of potential recontact problems began during 1964 as part  of the Apollo 
trajectory definition effort being performed at MSC. Various MSC organizations, with 
the assistance of the prime and support contractors for  the Apollo Program, were 
originally involved in the identification of the potential collision problems and the 
definition of corrective action to avoid these problems. In addition, generalized sepa- 
ration studies were performed by a support contractor. In November 1966, the scope 
of this support was altered from studies of a general  nature to studies directly applica- 
ble to specific Apollo missions. During this  time, no single MSC organization had 
overall  responsibility f o r  the analyses. Conseqilently, crew procedures, separation 
techniques, control modes, and operational requirements were  obtained from a variety 
of sources. Because of this  fact, it was recognized that efficiency and mission opera- 
tions could be improved by assigning the functional responsibility of performing the 
Apollo separation and recontact analysis to  a single organization. Because the problem 
was basically operational in nature, the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the 
MSC was selected for  this  task in June 1967. 
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The scope of the separation analyses was defined officially to include the following 
objectives. 
1. Evaluate operationally the separation modes defined for  each Apollo mission. 
2. Verify separation techniques, identify accidental recontact problem areas, 
establish a sequence of events, and recommend procedural o r  technical changes when- 
ever  necessary.  
3. Develop the necessary analytical procedures and techniques required to per- 
fo rm a detailed analysis. 
The Apollo Joint Separation and Recontact Working Group, composed of repre-  
sentatives f rom the pr ime and support contractors and of appropriate MSC personnel, 
was established in  May 1968. At these working group meetings, which were 
chaired by MSC personnel, the knowledge and capabilities of the prime and support 
contractors were used by seeking their  technical expertise to aid in decisionmaking and 
by using their  capability to supply most of the input data  required for  separation anal- 
yses. In addition, the working group assisted each organization in recognizing and 
understanding the problems faced by the other organizations; achieved the goal of 
coordinating the activities of the different participating organizations in the separation 
study effort; and minimized duplications, e r rors ,  and confusion. 
The separation and recontact effort for the Apollo Program remained with the 
FOD through the final Apollo mission. A broad base of experience was developed by 
placing the responsibility fo r  the separation and recontact effort with one organization. 
This  experience proved advantageous in solving the Apollo separation problems. 
COMPUTER SIMULATION DEVELOPMENT 
The use of separable spacecraft modules o r  components fo r  the Apollo Program 
required the development of procedures and maneuvers to  ensure a safe and proper 
separation. The analysis included nonnominal situations to reduce the possibility of 
accidental recontact o r  collision should a contingency occur. The recontact could have 
occurred during the actual separation o r  ejection process  o r  subsequently during the 
resulting relative motion of the separated components. The analysis required the use 
of three- and six-degree-of -freedom computer programs so that all Apollo separation 
sequencing could be fully and accurately simulated. To better understand the complex- 
ity of the problem and the system modeling required to perform the analysis, the fol- 
lowing separation events are given in the order of occurrence during a typical lunar 
landing mission: 
1. The launch escape tower (LET) from the command and service module (CSM) 
2. The CSM from the SLA panels and the Saturn IVB (S-IVB) 
3. The SLA panels from the S-IVB 
3 
4.  The LM from the S-IVB 
5. The service module (SM) scientific instrument module (SIM) bay door f rom 
the CSM 
6. The CSM from the LM 
7. The LM ascent stage from the LM descent stage 
8. The LM from the CSM 
9. The subsatellite f rom the CSM 
10. The experiment instrument booms from the CSM 
11. The docking ring and probe adapter f rom the CSM 
12. The CM from the SM 
One of the primary problems that had to  be solved was the inadequacy of the 
available three- and six-degree -of -freedom computer programs to provide the simula- 
tion capability required to analyze the many Apollo separation events. Therefore, the 
evolution of the required simulation capabilities was important to the overall  experi- 
ence gained from the Apollo Program in the separation study effort. 
Originally, the computer simulation capability was a multivehicle, three- 
degree-of -freedom program that had been modified to perform simple separation 
studies. To increase the efficiency in running general  parametric studies, separation 
computer programs to  be run on an analog computer system were developed in 
mid-1966. Late in 1966, the analog capability evolved into a hybrid computer concept 
in which the advantages of a digital and analog system were combined into one com- 
puter. In mid-1967, a detailed review of the Apollo separation and recontact simulation 
capability resulted in a decision to continue the support contractor 's  hybrid programing 
effort then in progress  and to transfer this capability to  the MSC hybrid system when 
the effort w a s  completed. During the same period, MSC personnel had expanded and 
modified the original two-vehicle, three-degree-of -freedom digital program to  accom- 
modate simultaneously as many as eight vehicles; this  expansion, combined with the 
aforementioned planned t ransfer  of the support contractor 's  hybrid program effort to 
MSC, was expected to provide all the simulation capability necessary to analyze the 
separation sequences for  future Apollo missions. 
Because of rigid schedules and the large volume of productivity that was 
required, the original decision to move all the hybrid capability to MSC was altered to 
retain a portion of the capability at the support contractor facility and to  divide the 
desired capabilities between the two hybrid systems. The altered plan also provided 
fo r  the retention of the entire set of hybrid capabilities in a digital program that was 
developed for  verification. Initially, the purpose of this  digital program was to pro- 
vide a verification base for  the two hybrid programs and to provide an analysis capa- 
bility for  time-critical problems. However, as the Apollo Program entered the 
operational phase, the hybrid capabilities could not provide the required output because 
of the increase in t ime-crit ical  problems and the constraints of the associated 
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schedules. Thus, the use  of these programs diminished to such apoint that all maintenance 
and updating efforts were terminated; and all further analysis was performed by using 
an all-digital simulation. Termination of t.he hybrid cqxibility a!!owed the c6ficeiiti-a- 
tion of all resources  on the all-digital program, named Dynamic Analyzer fo r  Separa- 
tion and Recontact, which proved advantageous for solving the separation analysis 
problem. 
SUMMARY OF S I  GNI F I  CANT SEPARATION STUD I ES 
FOR EACH APOLLOMISSION 
Many separation studies were performed during the Apollo .Program. The more 
significant of these analyses, the accidental recontact problems identified, and the 
solutions to these problems for  each of the Apollo missions are described in this 
report  to emphasize the importance of comprehensive detailed project planning. With- 
out this  detailed planning, some of the problem areas presented and discussed here  
would have remained unidentified and unsolved; they could have become crit ical  real- 
time problems, jeopardizing crew safety and mission success. The following discus- 
sion of the more significant separation problem areas emphasizes the impact of these 
problem areas on crew safety and mission success. The discussion demonstrates that, 
through detailed comprehensive planning, these problem situations can be identified 
and resolved before the mission rather  than during real time o r  after the flight. 
Apollo 1 
The first Apollo mission was an unmanned ballistic mission performed to  assess 
the maximum total  heat rate on the command module (CM) at supercircular entry 
velocities and to  evaluate the Saturn IB (S-IB) launch vehicle. 
Possible recontact situations between the CSM and S-IVB, between the CM and 
SM, and between the CM and S-IVB were investigated before the mission. Results 
indicated that the CSM separation from the S-IVB could be performed with SM reaction 
control system (RCS) separation maneuvers as small as 11 seconds in duration and 
still remain free of recontact problems. 
A parametr ic  CSM separation study indicated that separation distances varied 
only slightly when the CM and the SM were separated at attitudes between 0" and loo", 
plus-X axis above the local horizontal plane. Therefore, an attitude of 60" above the 
local horizontal plane was selected for  the first Apollo mission primarily because 
separation at th i s  attitude required very little CM orientation to achieve the entry 
attitude. 
A determination of when the S-IB should be shut down to allow the launch escape 
vehicle (LEV) to  perform a safe abort separation of the CM from the S-IVB was the 
objective of another analysis. The resul ts  of this analysis indicated that, to ensure no 
recontact between the aborting LEV and the S-IB, the t ime for  booster engine cutoff 
enable should be 40 seconds after lift-off. This booster engine cutoff t ime was accepted 
by the United States A i r  Force Eastern Test Range safety personnel. 
5 
Apollo 2 
No separation studies were performed f o r  the Apollo 2 mission because it was a 
test of the launch vehicle only. 
procedures were required. 
The spacecraft  was not flown; therefore, no separation 
Apollo 3 
The evaluation of the S-IB launch vehicle and a test on the performance of the 
spacecraft heat shield during a high-heat-load, long-duration entry w e r e  iiie pi-iiiie 
objectives of the Apollo 3 mission. 
Separation studies of the CSM and S-IVB indicated that a 0.91-m/sec ( 3  ft/sec) 
separation maneuver would be sufficient to  preclude recontact. 
showed that, for  abort  and nominal entries,  SM separation from the CM at 60" above 
the positive local horizontal would yield maximum separation clearances.  In addition, 
the study showed that, if the CM service propulsion system (SPS) failed to ignite a t  the 
t ime of the first burn, accidental recontact could be avoided by extending the CSM RCS 
plus-X translation to 75 seconds, by initiating the S-IVB engine cutoff, and by ensuring 
the S-IVB attitude control during venting. 
The CM/SM study 
Apollo 4 
The unmanned Apollo 4 mission used the S-IVB to inser t  the spacecraft  into a 
circular  Earth parking orbit and to  perform a simulated translunar injection maneuver 
to place the spacecraft on a highly elliptical Earth-intersecting trajectory.  
Only two separations, CSM/S-IVB and CM/SM, were associated with the Apollo 4 
mission; however, several  accidental recontact problems were identified. During the 
launch phase, i f  an  abort occurred involving an SPS ignition failure, recontact between 
the CSM and the S-IVB would be imminent. This problem could be avoided by com- 
manding the S-IVB ullage maneuver off upon S-IVB abort shutdown. 
For  the nominal CSM/S-IVB separation sequence, an inoperative SPS could resul t  
in recontact between the spacecraft and fragments of the destructed S-IVB after the 
planned bulkhead-reversal test. The solution fo r  avoiding this  problem was to  estab- 
lish warning t imes,  for  the crew and ground control, that would provide sufficient t ime 
to  enable a two-jet o r  four-jet RCS separation to achieve a safe separation clearance 
and avoid recontact with the debris .  
Another potential problem area concerned the possibility of the LEV recontacting 
the Saturn IV booster if a launch phase abort  occurred. If the booster were to  cut off 
at approximately 42 seconds after lift-off, the 243.8-meter (800 foot) constraint on 
lateral separation distance between the LEV and the booster would be violated. There- 
fore,  the recommendation that the booster enable cutoff setting be 30 seconds o r  less 
was implemented to ensure adequate separation clearances.  
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~ Apollo 5 
I The Apollo 5 mission was flown primarily to test the LM in  a near-Earth-orbital 
environment for verifiration nf LM systems. After orbit insertinn, the aerodynamic 
shroud was separated from the S-IVB and then the four SLA panels were opened. After 
S-IVB/LM separation, LM abort  staging using the ascent propulsion system was  
planned. 
The nOXin31 aerodynamic shroud jettison procedure was foilnd to be free of recon- 
tact problems, and recommendations were made for shroud jettison procedures to be 
used in the event of an abort  mission. The S-IVB passivation experiment procedures 
were analyzed, and the resu l t s  were used to define the safe range of operational atti- 
tudes that would avoid potential collisions during the experiment. The LM abort  staging 
sequence was free of recontact problems as planned. 
Apollo 6 
The Apollo 6 mission was s imilar  to the Apollo 4 mission in that a translunar 
injection burn was  simulated. Following translunar injection, it was  planned that the 
S-IVB attitude propulsion system would perform a reorientation maneuver to the CSM 
SPS retrograde burn attitude; then the CSM would separate and return to Earth. The 
separation analysis of this  procedure indicated that the S-IVB would probably recontact 
the CSM if the S-IVB attitude propulsion system failed to properly orient the CSM to the 
cor rec t  burn attitude. A solution to  the problem specified that the CSM, and not the 
S-IVB, should orient to the burn attitude and that the CSM should perform a 10-second, 
four-jet RCS translation to achieve adequate clearance from the S-IVB. This  solution 
was also recommended to preclude a possible recontact problem for an ear ly  t rans-  
lunar injection burn termination. 
Another CSM/S-IVB recontact problem was identified for  an alternate Earth 
parking orbit  where the S-IVB was to be positioned above and in front of the CSM at the 
t ime of the SPS burn ignition. A procedure w a s  designed to eliminate recontact for  
this  case by proper orbital positioning of the CSM/S-IVB separation maneuver at one 
revolution before the first SPS burn. 
Apollo 7 
Apollo 7, the first manned Apollo mission, was flown to evaluate the crew/ 
spacecraft operational compatibility, to  evaluate a transposition and simulated docking 
exercise,  and to evaluate a CSM-active rendezvous procedure. 
A l l  CSM/S-IVB separations investigated were free of recontact prnblems except 
f o r  launch phase aborts  after the LET jettison in which the SPS thrust-vector-control 
rate damping was  used. This recontact possibility, which was identified to  exist at any 
t ime during the entire launch phase, could be procedurally avoided by requiring a 
faster crew reaction in identifying and initiating an abort. 
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A relative motion analysis of the transposition and docking simulation exercise,  
and of the CSM-active rendezvous, indicated that all sequences were free of accidental 
recontact problems. 
Beginning with the Apollo 7 mission, the separation attitude fo r  the CM and SM 
was changed from an in-plane attitude used on previous Apollo missions to an out-of- 
plane attitude. The new separation attitude was to be attained by inertially holding the 
deorbit burn attitude and yawing the CSM 45" out of the orbit  plane. This procedure 
would preclude a possible recontact between the CM and SM for  any entry, regardless  
of the aerodynamic lift profile of either vehicle. The recommendation was made and 
accepted to perform tiis out-of-piane 5ivI jeiiisuri as s w u r i  as possible &ei* deoi-bit burn 
cutoff to increase the separation distances during entry. 
Procedures were designed for  a contingency in which nominal CSM separation 
from the S-IVB could not be accomplished. If this  failure occurred, only the CM would 
be separated from the SM/S-IVB configuration, and the mission would be terminated. 
Postflight analysis of the SM relative motion from the CM was made for  this  
mission because of a deviation between the actual SM trajectory,  which was determined 
by radar  tracking, and the predicted trajectory.  The reconstructed trajectory indi- 
cated a total relative separation delta velocity (AV) of approximately 9.14 m/sec 
(30 ft/sec), which was much smaller  than the predicted 88.39 m/sec (290 ft/sec). The 
reduction in relative separation velocity occurred because the SM failed to  remain 
spin stabilized throughout the complete separation maneuver. However, the analysis 
indicated that, although the separation velocity had been reduced significantly, the 
reduction did not create  a recontact problem between the CM and SM during entry. 
Apollo 8 
The Apollo 8 mission was the first manned flight in which the three-stage 
Saturn V rocket booster was used and the first mission in which the crew orbited the 
Moon. Therefore, new separation procedures and analyses were required for  almost 
every phase of the mission. Abort and alternate mission plans were new and were thor- 
oughly analyzed for  identification of possible recontact problems. The same kind of 
CSM evasive maneuver used during the Apollo 7 mission to evade the S-IVB was not 
applicable for  the Apollo 8 mission because the Earth-orbital effects on relative motion 
could not be used advantageously. The evasive maneuver for  the Apollo 8 mission 
would be required after the translunar injection burn; therefore, the separation tra- 
jectory would not be perturbed significantly by orbital effects. The CSM evasive 
maneuver was redesigned to consist of a 0.46-m/sec ( 1 . 5  ft/sec) RCS translation along 
the positive radius vector of the Earth (away from the Earth).  The maneuver was 
designed to be initiated with the spacecraft located in a stationkeeping position 
15.2 meters  (50 feet) ahead of and 12.2 meters  (40 feet) above the S-IVB, with the 
CSM apex pointed toward the Earth. 
The CSM minus-X RCS translation should have produced an adequate, safe dis-  
placement f rom the S-IVB and avoided any recontact problems during the launch 
vehicle lunar targeting maneuvers. However, the actual stationkeeping maneuvers 
were not executed correctly;  at the t ime for the nominal evasive maneuver, the space- 
craf t  was not located in the correct  stationkeeping position. This fact was unknown to 
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the crew o r  ground control at  the time and, thus, the evasive maneuver was executed 
from the incorrect relative position. The objective of satisfactorily evading the S-IVB 
was  not achieved, and this fa i lure  was soon confirmed through visual tracking reported 
crew in real time, and executed satisfactorily to alleviate the unfavorable relative 
position between the two vehicles. Postflight analysis of this problem revealed that 
the spacecraft did not orient the full  180" in the pitch plane after initially separating 
from the S-IVB, which was necessary to null the separation velocity completely and 
therefore esta3lish a stationkeeping position. In addition, the spacecraft plus-X axis 
could not be alined visually along the negative radius vector as originally planned fo r  
the first evasive maneuver. As  a result, the spacecraft attitudes were approximately 
15" and 45" in e r r o r  for  the first and second maneuvers, respectively. 
hy the p r p w .  -4 secnfic! grGflnd-cnmputec! evasi...e rnLqeu\'cr -3;;s defined, relayed to the 
It was  evident that for  future missions each stationkeeping and evasive maneuver 
should be defined to include the following: (1) specific spacecraft inertial measurement 
unit gimbal attitudes that are computed and simulated before the mission and updated 
in real t ime and (2) visual, out-the-window monitoring attitudes of the S-IVB o r  any 
other space vehicle in the vicinity of the spacecraft when maneuvers are planned. 
The Apollo 8 mission was also the first mission during which the SLA panels were  
jettisoned from the S-IVB. The primary objective of jettisoning the four panels was to 
prevent the SM RCS thrust plumes f rom reflecting off the deployed panels and onto the 
LM. At spacecraft separation, ihe  SLA was pyrotechnically severed from the SM and 
into four panels that were hinged to the S-IVB. As the CSM translated forward, the 
four panels deployed o r  rotated outward from the S-IVB and LM; and, after opening 
through an angle of approximately go", they were spring 6jected from the S-IVB with 
a velocity of 2.44 m/sec (8 ft/sec) o r  greater .  
An analysis was performed to determine i f  the panel jettisons would create  any 
potential recontact problems with the spacecraft for  the nominal mission, for  launch- 
phase or  Earth-orbital aborts, o r  for  alternate missions. The resul ts  indicated 
adequate separation clearances for  all phases of flight, with the single exception of 
re t rograde mode I11 SPS aborts. For this particular abort, the essential  retrograde 
mode I11 burn would cause the spacecraft to  fly in and through the area in which the 
four panels had been jettisoned. However, the low probability of a mode I11 retrograde 
abort combined with the low probability of recontact was considered acceptable. 
Apollo 9 
The Apollo 9 mission was a 10-day, Earth-orbital mission that was flown to 
demonstrate the combined operational capability of the CSM and LM to perform selected 
functions of the lunar landing mission. 
The following nominal separations were analyzed for  the immediate, close-in, 
and eventual recontact regions: CSM separation from the S-IVB, jettison of the four 
SLA panels, LM ejection from the S-IVB, LM undocking from the CM, LM staging, 
LM ascent stage jettison from the CSM, and CM/SM separation. 
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Following transposition and docking, the CSM/LM configuration was spring 
ejected from the S-IVB. This was the first Apollo mission in which the docked con- 
figuration used four compressed springs to expel itself f rom the S-IVB. Originally, it 
had been planned to use the CSM RCS thrus te rs  to withdraw the LM; however, primarily 
because of jet plume impingement onto the LM, the withdrawal technique was replaced 
by the spring-ejection method. This was the same kind of problem that resulted in the 
decision to jettison the four SLA panels on the Apollo 8 mission. The LM ejection 
procedure was evaluated and proved to be a successful separation technique fo r  
Apollo 9 and subsequent missions. 
r n r  1 ne perr~orr~ii~~i~e of a piaiiiied posiej eciioii CSTVT/LTVT Eai-iii-oi-biidi maneuver io 
evade the S-IVB was based on premission separation and recontact analysis. A 
minus-X RCS translation burn was to be performed in a pitched-down attitude, taking 
advantage of the continuous propulsive venting of liquid hydrogen from the S-IVB and 
advantage of the orbital motion effects to produce the desired separation clearances.  
For LM jettison and subsequent ascent propulsion system testing, the spacecraft 
was to  be placed in a safe relative position with respect to the LM by orienting the 
CSM/LM configuration to the ascent propulsion system burn attitude and then holding 
the configuration inertially stable. Before executing the burn, the CSM was to jettison 
the LM, maneuver to a stationkeeping position, execute a pitchdown and yaw out-of- 
plane orientation maneuver, and then perform a four-jet minus-X RCS evasive maneu- 
ve r  to obtain the desired displacement between the CSM and the LM ascent stage. This  
procedure would permit as much as a 0.61-m/sec (2 ft/sec) e r r o r  in stationkeeping 
relative velocities and would still ensure a safe separation distance at the t ime of 
ascent propulsion system ignition. It was designed to avoid the repetition of problems 
experienced during the Apollo 8 mission because of stationkeeping maneuver e r r o r s .  
A new SLA panel separation and recontact evaluation was based on new attitudes 
and resultant velocities that encompassed the higher panel-deployment rates of 60 to 
74 deg/sec observed in the Apollo 7 postflight analysis. The higher opening rate of 
74 deg/sec could result  in panel jettisons at a maximum attitude of 130" and at a 
maximum velocity of 4.27 m/sec (14 ft/sec). Minimum values previously analyzed 
were 90" and 2.44 m/sec (8 ft/sec). The new separation attitudes and jettison veloc- 
ities were f r ee  of recontact problems for  all mission phases except for  the retrograde 
mode III abort  region, which was previously identified. 
Apollo 10 
The Apollo 10 mission was flown to evaluate the LM operationally in lunar orbit 
while separated from the CSM. No landing was attempted, but the LM did maneuver 
into a low perigee orbit s imilar  to the one from which a landing would be attempted on 
the next Apollo mission. 
The Apollo 10 mission was the first mission for  which a separation procedures 
handbook was published in addition to the separation analysis summary document. The 
procedures handbook was originated primarily to furnish the flight controllers a con- 
venient separation reference during premission simulations and during the actual 
mission. It proved to be a valuable aid and was published fo r  each of the remaining 
Apollo missions. 
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Beginning with the Apollo 10 mission, a more conservative transposition and 
docking procedure was defined, with only minor changes from the one used on the 
Apollo 7 and 9 missions. The initial separation velocity and the first nulling maneuver 
tance f rom the S-IVB. The new transposition and docking procedure was found safe, 
and was used without change f o r  the remaining Apollo missions. 
.&?,by reduced in magn;,u& te sax,..re -R.CS p . Q p e ~ ~ ~ f i t  z2d te  decrease the EeparatiQE dis-  
Pr imari ly  to  conserve RCS fuel and to eliminate the effects of e r r o r s  for  small  
RCS maneuvers, a decision was made to use the CSM SPS for the post-transposition- 
docking-and-extraction evasive maneuver f rom the S-IVB. This was a new separation 
procedure for  the Apollo 10 mission; and subsequent analysis revealed that, if the 
S-IVB liquid hydrogen propulsive vent did not close before LM ejection, a potential 
recontact problem would exist  between the S-IVB and LM after ejection. Therefore, a 
decision was made to orient the CSM t o  the evasive maneuver attitude immediately 
after ejection and to  perform a 5-second plus-X RCS translation, if necessary. 
During the nominal lunar rendezvous, the LM descent stage was planned to be 
jettisoned in a posigrade direction 10 minutes before the ascent-stage insertion 
maneuver, which was performed in a retrograde direction 27" above the local horizon- 
tal. If LM staging were performed as planned at  10 minutes before the insertion 
maneuver, then the LM descent stage would be ahead and above the ascent stage at the 
t ime of the insertion maneuver, and there would be no possibility of recontact. How- 
ever ,  if staging were executed early,  then the t ra jector ies  of the two vehicles would 
intersect.  The descent stage would have required 65 minutes to  reach this intersection 
point, and the LM ascent stage would have required 2 minutes to  reach the same point. 
Consequently, if staging had been performed at 63 minutes before the insertion maneu- 
ver,  the ascent stage would have recontacted the descent stage 2 minutes after the 
insertion maneuver. For this  reason, early staging was to have been avoided. To 
ensure that the descent stage was in a safe relative position for  the ascent stage inser-  
tion burn, and thus avoid any accidental recontact problems, it was  recommended that 
staging not be performed between 53 and 73 minutes before the insertion maneuver. 
After staging, the descent-stage motion relative to the CSM was retrograde; and, 
because of the longer orbital period, the descent stage would approach the CSM from 
a posigrade direction approximately 15 revolutions later. Real-time monitoring of this 
relative motion problem was performed to determine if a CSM out-of-plane evasive 
maneuver was required. The crewmen saw the descent stage approaching, but it was 
determined through real-time computations that the descent stage would pass  to the 
rear of the spacecraft with adequate separation clearance. No CSM evasive maneuvers 
were required. 
Originally, the procedure f o r  LM ascent-stage jettison was planned to  be the 
same as that used during the Apollo 9 mission, in which the ascent propulsion system 
was allowed to burn to fuel depletion. At the crew's preference, the procedure was 
changed to the extent that, after ascent-stage jettison, the CSM would maneuver f rom 
a position below the LM to one above it and then perform a radially upward evasive 
maneuver of 0.61 m/sec (2 ft/sec). This would cause the spacecraft to  translate above 
and behind the LM and place the crew in a favorable relative position fo r  observing the 
ascent propulsion burn. Upon ascent-stage jettison, however, a separation velocity, 
which was la rger  than predicted, was imparted to the CM and LM from the severance 
of the docking tunnel. This caused the spacecraft to translate rapidly below and ahead 
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of the LM, which resulted in sunlight interference in the CM windows when visual 
acquisition of the LM was attempted. Therefore,  the crew-preferred relative position 
was not attained because the necessary CSM maneuvers to  achieve that position were 
not attempted. The CSM drifted below and ahead of the LM instead of above and behind. 
However, no recontact problems were detected. A separation velocity that was higher 
than expected was probably produced by higher-than-expected gas  pressure  i n  the 
docking tunnel, 
Apollo 11 
The Apollo 11 mission was flown to attempt the first manned lunar landing, to 
conduct exploration and scientific experiments, and to re t r ieve lunar soil  and rock 
sample s . 
For the Apollo 11 mission, the LM ascent stage did not contain enough propellant 
to  achieve solar orbit  with a fuel depletion burn as had been done on the Apollo 10 
mission. Instead, the separation procedure for  the ascent stage was altered to leave 
it in lunar orbit and place the CSM in a safe position to continue the nominal t ime line. 
The jettison sequence fo r  the LM was planned and executed with a local spacecraft 
pitch attitude of 45" and a four-jet minus-X RCS translation for a AV of 0.30 m/sec 
(1 ft/sec), to avoid any possible recontact. 
Possible ascent-stage recontact with the descent-stage plume deflectors during 
lift-off from the lunar surface was investigated for  this  first lunar landing mission. 
Lunar slopes as steep as 45",  which was the static stability limit of the LM, were con- 
sidered. Results of the analysis indicated that even fo r  a worst-case (45") slope, a 
minimum clearance of over 18 centimeters (7 inches) was maintained between the 
ascent stage and the plume deflectors of the descent stage. 
Immediate recontact problems associated with the LM RCS staging under nonnom- 
inal and alternate mission conditions were also investigated. Nominal LM staging 
under abort-guidance-section control could best be performed with narrow dead-band 
l imits  for r a t e s  less than 6 deg/sec; and, for  rates of 6 deg/sec o r  greater ,  staging 
could best be accomplished with a l-second plus-X RCS direct  ullage maneuver without 
LM digital autopilot o r  abort-guidance-section control. No control mode was available 
that would completely eliminate interstage recontact for  an inadvertent staging. Recon- 
tact would most likely occur between the ascent-stage fuel tank brace and the jet plume 
deflector supports approximately 10 seconds after inadvertent staging when narrow 
dead band was  used and the ascent propulsion system igniiiion signal delay was 0 sec- 
onds. For nominal, powered-descent, abort-staging procedures, a recontact situation 
existed at the environmental control system lines when the descent propulsion system 
tail-off thrust  was nominal o r  greater  than nominal. To avoid this  problem, a 
decision was made to  use plus-X RCS translation at LM staging. 
For CM/SM separation, a minus-X RCS separation burn to fuel depletion was 
planned to increase the SM entry velocity and decrease the flightpath angle so the SM 
would graze the Earth atmosphere and "skip out" into an orbit with an apogee grea te r  
than 926 000 kilometers (500 000 nautical miles). However, based on crew sightings 
of the SM and based on the atmospheric breakup, it was concluded that the SM separa-  
tion sequence was not occurring as predicted. Although there  was no apparent 
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recontact problem, the fact that the Apollo 11 crew saw the SM when they should not 
have and the fact that radar  tracking of the Apollo 10 SM also indicated this  anomaly 
prompted a detailed study of the SM stability and trajectory deviation after separation. 
The purpose of the study was  to determine if an unstable SM coi-ilc! r e s ~ l t  in the devi&,ed 
t ra jectory and, if so, to  determine the cause of the SM instability following separation. 
If possible, a new procedure that would ensure a stable SM separation burn would be 
defined and verified. Particular emphasis was given to  the effect of propellant slosh, 
which was shown to  be capable of producing the erratic SM behavior that was  actually 
observed. Two dynamic models of propellant slosh were developed and were used to 
analyze the SM jettison procedure. The resul ts  led to  the use of a new jettison proce- 
dure that would ensure stable SM a t t i hdes  during the separation burn. The new 
procedure involved reducing the RCS ro l l  thrust  duration from 5.5 to  2.0 seconds and 
setting the minus-X RCS burn to a duration of 25 seconds instead of a burn to propellant 
depletion. These changes were used for  the Apollo 1 3  mission and subsequent 
missions. Sufficient t ime was not available to make the necessary SM hardware 
changes for  the Apollo 12  mission; therefore,  SM separation was performed using the 
burn-to-fuel-depletion sequence of the Apollo 11 mission. 
Apollo 12 
The Apollo 12 mission was flown to continue lunar surface exploration and scien- 
tific experiments and to retrieve lunar soil and rock samples f rom a different surface 
area than the Apollo 11 mission. 
For the Apollo 12 mission, the attitude propulsion system burn, which was used 
on the Apollo 11 mission to target the S-IVB for  a preselected lunar impact point, was 
also used as an evasive maneuver. This action deleted the requirement fo r  a space- 
craft SPS evasive burn following transposition, docking, and extraction. The new 
evasive procedure was analyzed for  the Apollo 1 2  mission and verified as being free 
of recontact problems. After CSM/LM ejection from the S-IVB, the spacecraft was 
oriented to a viewing attitude that would enable the crew to visually monitor the S-IVB 
evasive maneuver sequence. The spacecraft vieiving attitude also doubled as a backup 
CSM evasive maneuver attitude. 
Apollo 13 
The Apollo 1 3  mission was flown to continue lunar surface exploration and experi- 
ments and to collect additional soil and rock samples. Analysis of the Apollo 13  launch 
vehicle operational trajectory indicated that the procedure for  mode I1 aborts of orien- 
ting the CM to  the entry attitude pr ior  to SM jettison was  not the best procedure to  
produce maximum separation distances during entry. The analysis indicated that 
orientation t o  the CM entry attitude before the SM separation was satisfactory for  an 
abort f rom a nominal booster trajectory. However, certain other aborts (e. g., an 
abort  resulting from a time-of-free-fall limit-line violation) would result  in SM jettison 
near  the time-of-entry interface that, if performed with the CM oriented to  the entry 
attitude, would reduce significantly the separation clearances. Therefore, a decision 
was made to jettison the SM immediately following the RCS abort  maneuver before the 
orientation of the CM to the entry attitude. 
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The lunar descent phase abort procedures were entirely different f rom those 
previously planned for  the Apollo 11 and 1 3  missions because the CSM was to perform 
the descent orbit insertion maneuver f o r  the Apollo 13 mission. The new procedures 
were evaluated and potential recontact problems were identified. The most probable 
opportunity for  a recontact problem to develop would be for a powered descent abort  
that w a s  initiated at approximately 10 minutes and 10 seconds after the f i r s t  powered 
descent initiation maneuver. If an abort  occurred at this  t ime, a recontact problem 
between the CSM and the LM ascent stage would exist. This  problem was resolved by 
specifying that the LM execute an out-of-plane velocity component in its insertion 
maneuver, o r  that the CSM perform an out-of-plane maneuver at the t ime of LM inser-  
tion. 
plane avoidance maneuvers, but only after the dangers of an accidental collision had 
passed. 
Subseqiieiit iliziieuvers during X X E ~ ~ Z V O E  WOU!~! null the effects of the out-of- 
When the Apollo 1 3  SM oxygen tanks ruptured during translunar coast, no emer -  
gency procedure had been defined for  the exact situation in which the SM was  inopera- 
tive and unusable for  re turn to Earth. However, a premission separation procedure 
had been defined for  returning to Earth with the LM, jettisoning it 1 hour before entry, 
and then jettisoning the SM before entry interface. This procedure specified that the 
SM was to produce the separation velocity required fo r  LM jettison by using its RCS. 
Because this  system was now inoperative, a technique w a s  developed for  using the LM 
RCS to produce the SM jettison velocity and using the LM docking tunnel pressure  to 
produce the LM separation velocity. The separation attitudes fo r  the SM and LM were 
the same as those defined in the premission analysis for  LM jettison 1 hour before 
entry interface. 
The SM jettison procedure was defined by the following: aline the LM plus-X 
axis along the positive radius vector, away from Earth;  yaw out-of-plane to  the south 
of the CM groundtrack; perform an LM RCS four-jet plus-X translation burn fo r  a 
velocity of 0.15 m/sec (0.5 ft/sec); jettison the SM; and perform an LM minus-X 
translation burn fo r  a velocity of 0.15 m/sec (0.5 ft/sec) to null the original maneuver. 
This separation maneuver, performed with the push-pull technique, was to occur 
2 hours before entry interface and leave the CM docked with the LM. 
The LM/CM separation procedure that was planned to  occur 1 hour before entry 
interface was analyzed for  separation velocity values of 0.30, 0.61, and 0.91 m/sec 
(1.0, 2.0, and 3.0 ft/sec). The resul ts  provided a parametric evaluation of the rela- 
tive separation distances for  various LM separation velocity values. The evaluation 
was necessary because of the uncertainty associated with the prediction of separation 
velocity resulting from severing the pressurized docking tunnel between the LM and 
CM. The LM jettison attitude was to be attained by alining the CM plus-X axis with 
the positive radius and yawing 45" out-of-plane to  the south, which was the same as 
that used fo r  the SM. 
As the Apollo 13  mission progressed, other separation t imes  and procedures 
were evaluated. For SM jettison, separation t imes  of 3.5, 4.5, 5.5, 6.5, and 
7.5 hours before entry interface were assessed. It was discovered during these simu- 
lations that, because of the earlier jettison t imes then under consideration, the SM 
out-of -plane jettison would not resul t  in grea te r  separation clearances.  Consequently, 
the recommendation was made that SM jettison be performed in-plane to achieve the 
maximum separation displacement f rom the CM. The latest separation procedures, 
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in which SM jettison was set at 4.5 hours before entry interface and LM jettison at 
1.0 hour before entry interface, were furnished to the flight controllers and verified 
as being free of any recontact problems. 
The actual SM and LM separations were not performed exactly as had been 
planned. The SM jettison occurred 4 hours 40 minutes before entry, ra ther  than the 
expected 4.5 hours before entry interface. The separation velocity of 0.58 m/sec 
(1.9 ft/sec) achieved f rom the push-pull technique was  la rger  than the predicted 
0.30 m/sec (1 €t/sec). As a result, the separation distances between the SM and the 
CM and LM were greater  than predictions made before separation. The LM jettison 
occurred approximately 11 minutes earlier than planned and in an unplanned, but 
acceptable, attitude. The LM was jettisoned 64" out-of-plane to the north rather  than 
45" out-of-plane to the south, and the pitch attitude of 64" above the local horizontal 
should have been 90". The actual separation velocity was 0.76 m/sec (2.5 ft/sec), 
0.15 m/sec (0.5 ft/sec) higher than the highest value considered before jettison. This 
combination of differences resulted in a decrease in total separation range from that 
predicted. At entry interface, the LM/CM clearance was 1372 meters  (4500 feet), 
approximately 1067 meters  (3500 feet) c loser  than previously estimated; however, no 
recontact problems were evident and none were reported. 
Apollo 14 
The Apollo 14 mission was flown to continue lunar surface exploration, to conduct 
scientific experiments, and to  collect lunar surface samples. During this  mission, the 
CSM encountered difficulty in performing a satisfactory docking with the LM/S-IVB 
configuration after translunar injection. Because of this  problem, plans for  using the 
backup evasive maneuver separation technique were considered. After several  
attempts, a successful docking was finally accomplished, and the nominal post t rans-  
position, docking, and extraction evasive maneuver sequence was used. Using the 
same procedures that had been developed for  previous missions, all other separation 
phases of the mission were nominal and without incident. 
Several new contingency procedures were developed fo r  the Apollo 14 mission 
but were not required. These procedures included a method fo r  safely returning the 
crew if the SLA failed to separate from the CSM after the translunar injection maneu- 
ver.  This method would involve flying the complete launch vehicle/spacecraft config- 
uration through a translunar coast, around the Moon, and to  a t ransear th  coast; and 
then executing a CM separation before Earth entry. Specific separation procedures 
were also developed and documented to cover an SM contingency of the type that 
occurred on the Apollo 1 3  mission after the translunar injection. 
Apol lo 15 
The Apollo 15 mission was flown to continue lunar surface exploration, to conduct 
scientific experiments, and to collect lunar surface samples. This was the first 
Apollo mission to use  the lunar roving vehicle (LRV) to aid in  surface exploration and 
sample collection and also the first mission to place a subsatellite i n  lunar orbit. 
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The addition of another interstage oxygen quick-disconnect line necessitated 
stage-separation studies of the Apollo 15 LM f o r  the nominal lift-off sequence, fo r  the 
aborts  from main powered descent, for  an RCS staging, and for  an inadvertent staging. 
This high-pressure line would exert approximately 4448 newtons (1000 pounds) of addi- 
tional force between the stages when it was severed at separation, substantially modi- 
fying the LM staging dynamics. The Apollo 15 analysis indicated that the RCS and 
inadvertent staging dynamics were improved by the addition of this  interstage oxygen 
line, and the separation sequence fo r  the nominal lunar lift-off staging precluded a 
recontact with o r  without the additional oxygen line. However, the Apollo 15 analysis 
did indicate the possibility that one of the plus-X RCS thrus te r  sk i r t s  could be in the 
ward during staging. This situation would exist only for  aborts initiated after descent 
engine shutdown during the main powered descent phase, and the recontact problem 
could only occur f o r  negative pitch rates combined with equal positive rol l  rates on the 
LM during staging, which was not expected to occur. 
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New nominal separation procedures were required for  the Apollo 15 mission 
because of the addition of the SIM to  the mission configuration. The SIM, which was 
installed in one of the SM structural  bays, contained scientific experiment instruments 
for  use in lunar orbit, The structural  metal  surface of the SM, covering the SIM fo r  
protection, w a s  designed to be severed pyrotechnically and jettisoned before instru- 
ment use. A jettison procedure was defined and used successfully 4.5 hours before 
lunar orbit insertion. One of the instruments contained in the scientific instrument bay 
was a subsatellite that was designed to be jettisoned and left in lunar orbit. On the 
Apollo 15 mission, the subsatellite was jettisoned a t  the orbital  ascending node, normal 
to the ecliptic plane, toward the north, on revolution 73. This jettison attitude and the 
1.22-mIsec (4 ft/sec) jettison velocity ensured adequate separation clearances between 
the subsatellite and the CSM for  the Apollo 15 mission. 
New contingency jettison procedures for  the two experiment instrument booms 
were developed for  use in the event that one of the booms, which were deployed to a 
length of 6.10 meters  (20 feet), failed to retract satisfactorily into the SIM bay. The 
booms, which must be retracted before all major SPS maneuvers, were designed to be 
jettisoned from the SM in the event of an unsatisfactory retraction. 
Apollo 16 
The Apollo 16 mission was flown to continue lunar orbit  and surface experiments 
and for  lunar surface exploration and sample collections. The LRV and subsatellite 
were also used on Apollo 16. 
The Apollo 15  nominal separation procedures were used on the Apollo 16 mission 
except for the final jettison of the LM ascent stage, which occurred in lunar orbit after 
rendezvous and docking on revolution 53. The CSM 0.61-m/sec (2 ft/sec) evasive 
maneuver f rom the ascent stage was executed at 5 minutes after the LM jettison and 
was  made in a posigrade instead of a retrograde direction as was planned for  the 
previous missions. This change ensured that the CSM would be pointed away f rom the 
LM ascent stage for  the evasive maneuver, even if it was delayed as much as 
45 minutes. 
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No new contingency procedures were developed for  the Apollo 16 mission. The 
same contingency or  alternate mission procedures developed fo r  previous Apollo 
missions would have been used, if required. 
Apollo 17 
The final Apollo mission was flown to continue lunar surface sample collections, 
to continue exploration, and to conduct orbital and surface scientific experiments. 
The final lunar landing mission of the Apollo Program used separation procedures 
identical to  the previous mission with the addition of jettison procedures fo r  the two 
high-frequency antenna booms of the lunar sounder experiment. These two antennas 
were nominally retracted into the scientific instrument bay of the SM, but would have 
to be jettisoned if a retraction failure occurred. No failure occurred, however, but 
jettison procedures were defined and verified before the Apollo 17 mission. No other 
accidental recontact problem areas were identified or  encountered during this mission. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
For  each of the Apollo missions, all separation procedures for  the nominal, 
alternate, and abort mission t ime lines were documented and published in one docu- 
ment. The separation procedures handbook became a valuable aid in  quickly deter-  
mining the cor rec t  separation sequencing to be used in the event a contingency 
developed during the mission. The handbook concisely described each separation 
sequence, pictorially depicted the vehicles being separated in their  correct  separation 
attitude, and graphically presented the resulting relative motions for each vehicle. 
For some separations, the spacecraft out-the-window viewing attitudes were provided 
so the crew could visually t rack what they were separating from. 
The Apollo spacecraft separation and recontact study effort progressed from 
small  parametric separation analyses for the first two missions to major evaluations 
of all separation sequences for  the remaining missions. The resu l t s  and recommenda- 
tions of these analyses were obtained from many organizations, both Government and 
contractor. A close working relationship was maintained among the personnel per-  
forming the separation studies, the flight crew support personnel, the flight con- 
t rol lers ,  and the support contractors. 
Use of the spacecraft  prime contractors later in the program helped make the 
total effort a success  because of their  knowledge of the s t ructures  and subsystems of 
the spacecraft. The establishment of the Apollo Joint Separation and Recontact Working 
Group, an informal organization with representatives f rom the prime and support 
contractors,  aided significantly in obtaining full cooperation f rom the various organiza- 
tions and individuals involved in the separation activities. From the experience gained 
to date, it is recommended that, for  future programs, the spacecraft prime contrac- 
t o r s  be included in the major separation and recontact analyses, start ing at the begin- 
ning of the program. 
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F o r  large complicated sys tems like those involved in the Apollo Program, the 
need f o r  th i s  type of analysis and resu l t s  should be recognized ear ly  in the program, 
and the overall responsibility should be assigned to  a single organization. Preparation 
should be made to  handle all interfaces h all operational modes, including failure 
situations. 
Based on the Apollo experience, it was very difficult and inefficient to  develop 
the large, complicated computer tools at widely dispersed geographical locations, on 
different computer hardware, and with several  groups involved. 
i-eijiiiring large, cijrnpkx c o i ~ p u t e r  p r ~ g r ~ ~ i n g  m d  zn~!ysis effcxts, c ~ ~ ~ ~ ! i d a t i ~ n  is 
mandatory f o r  gaining efficiency in identifying and solving recontact problems. 
F o r  future activities 
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